奥运会不欢迎“砸场子”的

——关于英国每日电讯报采访情况的一则说明

司马南

朋友转过来英国《每日电讯报》记者SPENCER先生的一篇文章，内容是关于司马南的采访，（文章及其部分翻译过来的内容附后）。远在英国的一位朋友看到这篇记者访谈，对笔者有微词，认为老司马一把年纪了，谈话很不得体，竟然让英国记者抓住了“民族主义情绪”。
这谈话是一回事，写文章是另外一回事。笔者管得住自己怎么说，却管不了别人怎么写。为正视听，姑且将这次接受采访的情况仅报告如下，请大家给评评理。
那天，在北京国家大剧院地下演播室主持节目，栏目的名称也叫《国家大剧院》，是北京电视台的一个栏目。丹皇芭蕾舞团近日来华，该期内容主要围绕丹麦皇家芭蕾舞展开，谈的是本人不熟悉但是十分有趣的的皇家芭蕾艺术话题，对话嘉宾是中国艺术研究院的舞蹈史专家刘晓真。
一个小伙子打来电话，称英国《每日电讯报》记者点名要采访我。我回答说今天太忙了，录完这个节目，还要去奥运会直播现场，恐怕没有时间。小伙子表示事情急迫所需时间不长。于是我们约好下午三点国家大剧院门口见。因为录制拖后，复约下午四点。及我匆匆从里边走出，他们已经等在大剧院北门口多时了。
大高个的英国记者SPENCER先生和翻译小伙子（打电话那位）迎上来例行寒暄，可到什么地方谈话呢？大剧院里咖啡厅正在装饰施工。我提议，就在大剧院巨大的蛋下随便找个地方凑合凑合，于是，大蛋的东北角水面与园林之间，“扭着一个弯儿”的人行道边上，我等三人面南而坐。
天很热，脸上带着妆，汗乎乎油腻腻的。参观旅游者络绎不绝，不时地有人过来打招呼……这地方接受采访，的确不太适宜。不过，剧院巨大穹庐般身影倒映在水中，与周边花红柳绿的园林景观相互映衬煞是好看，置身如此人间美景也属难得。若不是意外接受采访，还真想不到可以在这个地方坐上一坐。
SPENCER先生神色有一点忧郁，他掏出小本子和笔，并不看我，瞄了一会“圆形的蛋”，抛出了第一个问题：“国家大剧院，你认为这个建筑怎么样？”我表示自己不懂建筑，转述了两条别人的意见：其一，蛋形，不过是外壳而已，里边是独立的楼群，这个外壳造价与维护十分昂贵；其二，这个蛋壳造型，或与天安门周围环境不协调。因为上述两个原因，大剧院在建造过程中，曾经遭到部分人大代表和政协委员的反对。
“因为国家大剧院不是中国人设计的而遭到反对？SPENCER先生蓝褐色的眼睛注视着我的眼睛，语速明显加快。
“当然不是，中国今天没有人会用这样狭隘的观念思考问题”。我告诉他，CCTV大楼、水立方、鸟巢都是外国设计师的作品，今天的中国，已经是改革开放30年之后的中国，此乃寻常事也。
“那么，您本人反对外国设计师的设计吗？”他又执拗地追问——这都哪跟哪啊。我语气手势并用：NO。
接下来，SPENCER先生询问了一些我博客里边的内容，主要是关于《南方周末》和普世价值问题，问话很直接：“有人认为你反对改革开放，为什么？为什么要反对西方价值？”“西方的价值为什么不是普世价值？”“《南方周末》自由派报纸宣传普世价值有什么不好？”我哭笑不得地听着翻译的问话，然后一一作了解释。
译员翻译的过程中，他低头在小本上不停地写着，我瞭了一眼，使用的还是速记法——标准的GERUIGE速记，30年前我曾学习过这种速记方法。
虽然各秉立场话不投机，但这位采访者与那些急于给你带笼子的记者不同，他无意与你争辩，提了话头之后任由你说，只在中间适时加入追问。
关于“中国为什么至今不实行一人一票的民主”问题，我反问道：一人一票是选举的一种形式，还是民主的本质？若为民主的本质，美国今天的“代议制”岂非非民主？他听完翻译，马上转移了话题。
“为什么人民不应该有更多的自由？比如像美国那样”。
我首先把中国人今天享有的自由，与过去做了对比。我告诉他，30年间，中国人的自由度大大增加，您可以就此随便询问大街上的任何一个中国人，我希望您能在中国多呆一段时间，感受中国的进步。我举例说，包括你们喜欢的有个性报纸的“反体制行为”，这在讲究“政治正确性”的美国是不可思议的，但在中国，《南方周末》报纸照出，这叫不叫自由？这个自由，大了？小了？
“他们不对吗？难道美国不是中国的榜样吗？”SPENCER先生看着我的眼睛追问。
我答：向美国学习，以美国为榜样，话得分两头说。一方面，美国是个好榜样，我们事实上一直在学，也学了不少，连司局长培训都到美国哈佛去。但是美国同时又是坏榜样，我们不能学，也学不了。
首先，由于资源瓶颈限制，中国“学不了”美国。象美国人一样的消费模式，13 亿中国人都这么来，这个地球受得了吗?再增加五个地球也许有可能。其次，文化传统不同，中国“学不象”美国，我们的有孔夫子，你们有耶稣，孔夫子如何完全变成耶稣？其三，有些东西我们“不想学”，比方打科索沃，打南联盟，打阿富汗，打伊拉克，未免太霸道，恃强凌弱，中国人不忍也不齿。其四，即使学得特别象，又怎么样？20年前苏联倒是学得好。共产党解体了，国家解体了，连“解体的模式”都是都是按照美国人设计的蓝图来，美国人苏联人还都信着同一个上帝呢，结果怎么样？北约不是照样东扩吗？反导基地不是一样部署到俄罗斯边境小国吗？美国人策动的颜色革命不是照样一浪高过一浪吗？美国人不是一样指责普京不讲民主吗？……
SPENCER先生显然没有兴趣就我的话茬接下去。他再次变换了话题。谈到奥运，他问，为什么不可以在奥运期间表达对自由的信念，为什么不可以随便上街游行示威……我给他讲了一通“奥运非政治化”的道理，解释了一通“自由的边界是别人的自由”，又给他打了一个比方：奥运会好比一个大PARTY，在某户人家举行，为招待客人，主人打扫房子布置花草炮制美食杀猪宰羊且为乐，男男女女也玩得很开心，但是来客中却有人板着脸突然砸盘子骂脏话，在中国江湖社会，这叫“踢场子”，这不应该是有文明有教养的人干的事情，这种做法让大家都没面子，破坏了所有人的好心情。所以，注定是不受欢迎的。
因为急着赶赴现场筹备奥运直播，我们的谈话前后不到40分钟，大体内容如此。临分手我还叮嘱了一句，希望先生完整引用我的话。可以不同意我的观点，但不要作非客观描写。遗憾的是，这位记者还是按照自己的政治理念对采访对象做了习惯性解读，称“民族主义情绪在诸如司马南之类的博客中达到极端”其实，他未必真的看了我的博客——这让我再一次领教了什么叫新闻自由。
带着有色眼镜，对新闻事实作歪曲化处理，决非是针对我个人的，也不是什么新闻道德操守欠缺问题，而是表现了人家的政治正确性，他不这样处理那才奇怪了。欧美主流媒体，针对崛起的中国，步调一致阴阳怪气的表现告诉我们，至少到目前为止，他们还不准备“兑现关于普世价值的承诺。”
感谢这位坦诚的采访者，他在文章中说得很好：“年轻人以及那些自认为是受争议的自由思想者，比如司马先生。时时准备体现党的路线——这是现代中国最令人沮丧的方方面面之一”。 这一句拗口的洋话变成大白话就一目了然了：中国人民听党的话，洋大人无比沮丧。

一位好友看了此篇报道及近来其他境外记者对我的采访，说了一句意味深长的话：“人家说不过你司马南，可不表明就能接受你。每个人的观念都是根深蒂固的。”是啊，笔者得检视自己，总结经验，连自己的同胞沟通起来都这么费劲，更何况金发碧眼的欧罗巴人？这不也正是普世价值的传销者最难的地方吗？

附录：北京奥运：中国摆脱耻辱的世纪
如果北京奥运完全是为了宣传，那么可以肯定的一点是：宣传是有效力的
英国《每日电讯报》2008年8月2日

Beijing Olympics: China casts off a century of shame
If the Beijing Olympics are all about propaganda, one thing is certain: the propaganda works.
By Richard Spencer in Beijing
02 Aug 2008
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/othersports/olympics/2486937/Beijing-Olympics-China-casts-off-a-century-of-shame.html

On Wednesday evening this week, as dusk fell, the roads around China’s National Stadium went into a familiar lockdown. Traffic ground to a halt as the police barricades went up, siphoning cars away along Beijing’s many other ring roads and dual carriageways. The masses on foot, though, kept coming, lining the pavements, climbing fences, storming footbridges until the members of the chengguan, an auxiliary police force, were called in to keep order, holding hands to control the throng.

There was nothing to see other than the brightly lit outside of the stadium, the playful steel Bird’s Nest. But a rehearsal of the opening ceremony was scheduled for 8pm, and those who could not wait any longer came in their hundreds and thousands just to gawp as the excitement unfolded, invisibly, inside. Many had the national flag, with its yellow stars on a red background, painted on their cheeks. I met one man who had brought his son from Lanzhou, on the other side of China: they could not stay for the Games, but young Haopeng, eight, would nevertheless witness history. “It’s a kind of education, about sport and about patriotism,” Xu Haitong said. “It’s to show him the country is powerful and strong again.”

The Games are nothing short of a sacred ritual for this atheist state, and it is hard to exaggerate the enthusiasm. When the organisers advertised for volunteers to deal with baffled foreigners unused to local ways, a million people applied. Most of the 100,000 selected came from universities around the country, such as Wang Wenjia, a 21-year-old medical student who has trained eight hours a day for two weeks.

“First of all, it’s a great opportunity to be part of the Games,” he said, switching back and forth between Chinese and nervous but enthusiastic English, which he has been practising for this moment. “This is a once-in-a-hundred-year thing. Though I can’t compete in the field as an athlete, I can give my heart as a volunteer, give my passion. To offer my service to the spirit of the Olympics is very important.”

He defined that spirit as being based around “peace and unity”, which is the official line. But it is Mr Xu’s “powerful and strong” that resonates abroad, and in the guts of a billion Chinese. These Games, as everyone knows, are not about synchronised swimming, or inspiring teenagers to take up volleyball or weightlifting. They are about China standing up, in all its controversial glory. To those in the West who regard this as a threat, the response is at worst hostile, at best puzzled. “We are owed this chance to show the result of our endeavours to the world,” says Volunteer Wang. “It is to show the progress we have made.”

The Games have been described, to the point of tedium, as a “coming-out party”, a quaint term suggesting a shy debutante from a privileged but sheltered background. This could not be further from China’s self-image, which is rooted in poverty, shame and suffering, inflicted both from without – as the history books insist – and from within. As Susan Brownell, an American athlete, anthropologist and author of Beijing’s Games: What the Olympics Mean to China, puts it: “They are collective redemption for the national suffering of the past century.”

It is easy to put this down to the Communist Party’s manipulation of Chinese emotions. After the famines and purges of the Mao years, the one residual claim to legitimacy that the party can make is that it has unified China, after it came close to falling apart from colonial and Japanese occupation and then civil war. The message is rubbed in constantly in history books, in newspaper articles, on endless period dramas on television: before the revolution, China was hopelessly reduced, largely by malevolent foreigners – the same foreigners who now criticise the country for its record on human rights, its rule over Tibet and its lack of democracy.

This is why it has proved so hard for the West’s governments and human rights groups to use the Olympics as leverage to bring progress. For a decade, world leaders claimed that engagement with China would bring political reform. Three years ago, Tony Blair declared the momentum unstoppable. Jacques Rogge, the president of the International Olympic Committee, has been more circumspect, but he has also interwoven his insistence that the Games are above politics with assurances that they would change China for the better.

Yet in many ways the reverse is true: the Games have been an excuse for the party to assert control over an increasingly disparate society. It has knocked down hundreds of thousands of homes, many private, and relocated their inhabitants as part of its building programme. Less tolerance than ever has been shown towards dissent, with the police and assorted thugs saying little more than “Olympics” as they beat and threaten lawyers and writers. The single-party state is more entrenched than ever – and while a successful Games would make it seem invincible, one beset by protests and complaints might also serve only to unite party and people in a defensive laager.

【在许多方面，真实的情况是相反的：奥运会已成为党宣扬要加强对不断分化中的社会进行控制的一个借口。党推倒了数以十万计的家园，其中许多是私房，并将住户按建设计划拆迁到其他地方。对于异议人士更是空前地不宽容。当警察和乌七八糟的打手对律师和作家大打出手时，所用说辞经常就是奥运。这个一党制的国家比以往任何时候都更加牢固 - 成功的奥运似乎能表明党的无往而不胜，而抗议和抱怨引起的困扰似乎更能将党和民众团结到统一战线上。】

The nationalist mood reaches its extreme in bloggers such as Sima Nan, a television celebrity turned writer who lambastes the few liberal newspapers here for selling out to America. Mr Sima says that China is not ready for personal freedom, nor suited to one man, one vote. Liberals, he claims, want to do away with “Chineseness” and turn the country into a pale imitation of the West.

【民族主义情绪在诸如司马南之类的博客中达到极端。这位由电视名人转为作家的人士痛责中国少见的自由派报纸试图卖身于美国。司马先生说，中国还没有为个人自由做好准备，中国不适于搞一人一票制度。他说，自由派人士试图废弃“中国特色”，从而将中国变为西方的一个苍白的仿制品。】

When I asked him whether the Olympics were not supposed to represent universal values, he said its values were very different from those we have in mind. “There is no contradiction between Chinese attitudes and the spirit of the Olympics,” he said, defining the spirit of the Olympics, very much as Wang Wenjia had done, as “peace, competition and unity” – in short, a global festival of mutual honour and indifference to one another’s political systems. Those who want to use the Games to push other agendas are, he says, like people who “talk dirty and smash the dishes when they are invited to a party”.

【我问他奥运会是不是应该体现普世价值，他说奥运会的这些价值与我们现时谈论的价值非常不同。他说：“中国人的态度和奥运精神之间没有矛盾。”他与王文佳差不多，也将奥运精神定义为“和平、竞争和团结”，简言之，即相互尊重而无关乎各自政治体制的全球性的节日。他说，那些试图用奥运推动其他议程的人，就好比是“接受邀请参加晚会却在晚会上说脏话、砸盘子”。】

The readiness with which both the young and those who think of themselves as controversialist freethinkers, such as Mr Sima, mirror the party line is among the most depressing features of modern China. It takes an exceptionally beguiled heart not to want to take “peace” and “unity”, attach them to an Amnesty International banner, and beat the regime over the head with it.

【年轻人以及那些自认为是受争议的自由思想者，比如司马先生，竟时时准备体现党的路线，这是现代中国最令人沮丧的方方面面之一。心肠要被蒙蔽到什么程度才能抗拒把“和平”与“团结”写到大赦国际的一面旗帜上，并用它劈打执政者的面门】

Of course, there is more to China than the party, and more even to the Olympics. It was as far back as 1907 that a group of young men – who met through the YMCA, of all places – first expressed the hope that the country might one day stage the Games. The whole idea was relatively new, and three years before the Games had been held in America – another country on the rise. This is at once a reason the Chinese talk of the “hundred years’ dream”, and a reflection of how much many Chinese – whatever Mr Sima says – see America as a model rather than a rival.
当然，对于中国甚至对于奥运也仍有党外的意义。早在1907年，就有第一批的来自中国各地的年青人通过YMCA聚在一起，表达希望有朝一日能够主办奥运。这是相当新的创意，还在另一个崛起中的国家，即美国举办奥运之前三年。这也正是中国人谈论“百年奥运梦想”的一个原因，也反映出很多中国人在多大程度上视美国为榜样而非敌手，且不论司马先生本人如何放言。
In fact, Prof Brownell argues that much of the incessant Olympic propaganda has actually been intended to bring the country closer to the West. She has sat in on classroom projects where children are taught about the history of the Olympic movement and its ideals, without the heavy overlay of Communist theory that is so prevalent in other areas. Likewise, progressives have organised international exchanges and conferences in a whole range of fields, as a means of introducing Western standards.

“The Cultural Revolution generation that is now in charge have a sense that they were not well educated,” she says. “They hope to use the Games to shape the next generation, so that they are better prepared to take up their role in the world community.”

This is a more optimistic view than the party’s continued hostility to Western scrutiny might naturally evince. And Prof Brownell is the first to admit that some of the pre-Games disasters, in Tibet and elsewhere, have triggered a conservative backlash. Others believe there are serious tensions inside the leadership about the whole future of the reform agenda, which will be increasingly exposed by the simple question: what next? The Games have been a unifying force for the party, not just the country. Without them, politics, economics and the environment, the big issues for China’s future, are a limitless book.

The crowds on Wednesday were impressive, and the packed, passionate stadiums guaranteed when the gates open will be even more so. Whatever our feelings about the party that rules them, few of us will begrudge the Chinese people a moment of triumph. But their passion is also tense; on lesser sporting occasions – such as Japan’s victory in the final of football’s Asia Cup in 2004 – it has turned actively hostile to perceived enemies from abroad.

After the Games are all over, this feeling may need a new outlet – and we are entitled to ask of that, too, what next? Where will it be directed by the all-powerful political force at the top? If patriotic fervour continues to be directed at rebuilding a still fractured society, there is little to fear, except our own ability to compete. But nerves still hang heavy in the air.