摘要：我们正在见证“旧秩序的危机”。各发达国家都面临着类似的问题：负担过重的福利国家，老龄化的人口，以及日益低迷的经济发展。这些情况构成了此次全球危机的特点，也解释了危机为何会同时降临在美国、欧洲和日本。

【美国《华盛顿邮报》7月23日文章】题：经济艰难时期的背后是对新秩序的担忧（作者该报专栏作家罗伯特•萨缪尔森）

我们正在见证“旧秩序的危机”。各发达国家都面临着类似的问题：负担过重的福利国家，老龄化的人口，以及日益低迷的经济发展。这些情况构成了此次全球危机的特点，也解释了危机为何会同时降临在美国、欧洲和日本。

二战后由大部分民主国家构建的旧秩序依托于三大支柱。其一是福利国家。政府会保护失业人员、老人、残疾人和穷人。其二是对经济扩张的信心；这会提高人们的生活水平，同时允许收入再分配。最后，全球贸易和金融满足了各国的共同利益。

现在，这三大支柱都摇摇欲坠。可以肯定地说，金融危机使得形势雪上加霜，而每个国家又面临不同的处境。美国的国家福利不如德国丰厚。希腊开始出现危机是因为其瞒报了大量预算赤字；爱尔兰的危机始于房地产泡沫的破裂，引发了耗资巨大的银行救助行动。但这些差异掩盖了明显的相似之处。

先从福利国家说起。这对很多人来说是一大恩惠，但也是一个重负。福利国家的扩张十分迅速。1950年，法国的政府支出占国家经济（国内生产总值）的28%，德国占30%，美国占21%。按照已故经济史学家安格斯•麦迪逊收集的数据，到1999年，法国的政府支出占国内生产总值的52%，德国占48%，美国占30%。老龄化社会将加大未来在养老金、社会保障和医疗上的花费。从2008年到2050年，德国的65岁以上人口预计将增加40%，法国将增加77%，美国则将增加121%。

鉴于这一形势，即使目前尚未遭遇危机的国家也正采取紧缩措施。所有国家都面临着一个灾难性的抉择：为了给增大的福利支出提供资金，需要提高税收或增加赤字，但这将对经济造成进一步的破坏，而削减福利又会引起民众的强烈反对。

从理论上讲，如果经济加速增长，就能把政府从这个泥潭中解救出来。遗憾的是，这似乎是个幻想。确实，旧秩序的第二根支柱——深信经济会不断扩张——很值得怀疑。经济学家们似乎已经用尽了所有的常规政策手段。美联储等中央银行已经将利率保持在低水平。预算赤字居高不下。

美国一些经济学家主张，美国应该暂时增加赤字。这或许会奏效，但欧洲的经验却建议我们不要这样做。欧洲的高额赤字导致了更高的利率，反映出投资者对债务违约愈加担忧。对违约的担忧反过来削弱了银行——政府债券的主要持有者，并通过银行削弱整体经济。

一两个承担过多义务的国家所采取的财政紧缩政策可能会奏效；可以通过增加出口来弥补减少的国内开支，从而实现经济增长。但大多数发达国家实行的长期紧缩政策可能会严重拖累世界经济。

自二战以来总体适用的理念和制度蒙上了一层阴影。20世纪20年代和30 年代早期也是如此。当时，世界主要国家徒劳地想要保持金本位制，而金本位制在一战前维系了繁荣的经济秩序。人们有一种天生的本能，想要顽固坚持在政治和脑力上有所投入的原有想法和做法。这种惯性加剧了大萧条的严重性。

在现今未见缓解的政治喧嚣中，相似的情况正在发生。发达国家经济疲软的根源之一是消费者和企业对2008—2009年的严重金融危机仍然心有余悸。但这一后果因向后看的保守心态而变得复杂。各国政府均极力维护旧秩序，因为它们不理解新秩序，害怕新秩序。

Behind economic hard times, fear of the new

By Robert J. Samuelson, Published: July 26

We are witnessing “the crisis of the old order.” The phrase, coined by the late historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr. to describe the failure of unfettered capitalism in the late 1920s, also applies to the present, despite different circumstances. Everywhere, advanced nations face similar problems: overcommitted welfare states, aging populations, flagging economic expansion. These conditions define the global crisis and explain why it struck the United States, Europe and Japan simultaneously. We need to move beyond daily partisan fireworks to see this larger predicament.

The old order, constructed by most democracies after World War II, rested on three pillars. One was the welfare state. Government would protect the unemployed, aged, disabled and poor. Capitalism would be tamed. A second was faith in economic growth; this would raise everyone’s living standards while permitting income redistribution. Growth was ordained, because economists had learned enough from the 1930s to cure periodic recessions. Finally, global trade and finance served countries’ mutual interests.

All three pillars are now wobbling. To be sure, the financial crisis worsened matters, and each country’s situation is different. America’s welfare state is less generous than Germany’s. Greece’s crisis began because it had vastly underreported its budget deficit; Ireland’s stemmed from a burst housing bubble that led to a costly bank bailout. But these differences obscure large similarities.

Start with the welfare state. A blessing to many, it’s also a common burden. Its expansion was huge. In 1950, government spending as a share of a nation’s economy (gross domestic product) was 28 percent in France, 30 percent in Germany and 21 percent in the United States. By 1999, figures were 52 percent of GDP in France, 48 percent in Germany and 30 percent in the United States, according to figures compiled by the late economics historian Angus Maddison. Aging societies would boost future costs for pensions, social security and health care. From 2008 to 2050, the 65-plus population is projected to rise 40 percent in Germany, 77 percent in France and 121 percent in the United States.

Given this outlook, even countries without immediate crises are embracing austerity measures. All face a ruinous choice: The higher taxes or deficits needed to finance more welfare spending might further damage the economy, but cutting benefits stirs popular backlash. Still, benefits are now vulnerable. Ireland cut benefits for the unemployed by about 10 percent, reduced child payments by 16 percent and, beginning in 2014, will gradually raise the retirement age from 65 to 68.

On paper, faster economic growth could rescue governments from this trap. Unfortunately, this seems a mirage. Indeed, the old order’s second prop — faith in routine economic expansion — is suspect. Economists exaggerated their understanding and control. They seem to have exhausted conventional policy approaches. Central banks such as the Federal Reserve have held interest rates low. Budget deficits are high.

Some American economists argue the United States should temporarily run even bigger deficits. Perhaps that would work, but Europe’s experience counsels otherwise. Big deficits there led to higher interest rates, reflecting investors’ greater fears of default. Default anxieties in turn weaken banks — large holders of government bonds — and, through them, the broader economy. Although the United States hasn’t yet suffered this fate, it might, especially considering warnings from Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s that exploding federal debt could cause rating downgrades.

Austerity practiced by one or two overcommitted nations may succeed; their economies can grow by increasing exports to replace lost domestic spending. But prolonged austerity practiced by most advanced countries could be a huge drag on the world economy. To whom can they export? The obvious answer is China and other “emerging markets.” But China frustrates this possibility by maintaining an artificially low currency that subsidizes its exports and sustains large trade surpluses. China sees trade as a jobs creator. It shuns the notion of trading for mutual advantage — the old order’s third pillar. The political foundation of the global trading system is at risk.

We have left our collective comfort zone. Ideas and institutions that, on the whole, served well since World War II are under a cloud. The same was true in the 1920s and early 1930s. Then, the world’s leading nations vainly struggled to maintain the gold standard, which — before World War I — had anchored a prosperous economic order. There was a natural impulse to cling to familiar ideas and practices in which people were invested politically and intellectually. This inertia contributed to the Great Depression’s severity.

Amid today’s unrelenting political uproar, something similar is happening. Economic weakness in advanced countries stems partly from the residual trauma on consumers and companies following the ferocious 2008-09 financial crisis. But the effect is complicated by a backward-looking mentality. Governments everywhere are striving to protect the old order because they do not understand and fear the new.